City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Publications and Research

Bronx Community College

2019

The Free Education Project: Higher Education Funding, E2
Implementation, and Crowdsourcing Crypto Development
Louis Carter
Best Practice Institute

John R. Ziegler
CUNY Bronx Community College

Ovidui Purice
PreLedo

Edward Lehner Ph.D.
CUNY Bronx Community College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/bx_pubs/81
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

The Free Education Project: Higher Education Funding, E2
Implementation, and Crowdsourcing Crypto Development
Louis Carter
Best Practice Institute, USA
John R. Ziegler
Bronx Community College, CUNY, USA
Ovidiu Purice
PreLedo, Romania
Edward Lehner
Bronx Community College, CUNY, USA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This short paper, written in three different sections, explores how a cryptocurrency’s issuance
and network effects could fund higher education. Synthesizing research from the Bronx
Community College Cryptocurrency Research Lab, Bernard Lietaer’s notion of creating
money for the needs of society, lessons learned by Galia Benartzi and the Hearts Project, and
an exploration of how communities coalesce around open-source cryptocurrency projects, the
authors provide an overview of the problem of funding higher education, the ways in which
money that is needed could be created, and the key components to building a highly effective
developer community. These three distinct yet vitally interconnected facets lay the
groundwork for the Free Education Project. Lastly, based on the models herein, this paper
calls for academics, entrepreneurs, and financial professionals to work together in ways that
facilitate and generate the needed capital, built outside of taxation, to fund the noble
purposes of education writ large.
Keywords: crowdsourcing; cryptocurrency; higher education funding; masternodes; open
source projects; staking coins.
AN ODE TO ANNA - AND ANNAS IN THE BRONX AND BEYOND
Finding a job is hard, and I need the right kind of training and support. Also, I need
help paying for these resources, and I have a young son and family obligations. I don’t
always know where the money comes from.
Anna1, Class of 2020
1 pseudonym

The quote above describes the struggles faced by a single individual, 21 year-old aspiring
teacher Anna. Yet, based on our experience, it could just as easily have come from any of
the vast majority of students that we have taught at the Bronx Community College over our
careers. Anna, like many others, is a student who is full of ambition and a desire for success,
yet, due to both familial and financial concerns, as well as underpreparation in secondary
school, may have fewer than expected career opportunities in spite of her college
attendance, perhaps relegating her to a career of underpaying jobs. This is not only an
urban problem. Beyond the Bronx, students across the nation and around the world who
are attempting to transition into careers that provide both vocational fulfillment and
financial stability are challenged by the cost of receiving the requisite training and
education.
Academics who study the factors that are currently limiting Anna’s career trajectory call
this phenomenon ‘social reproduction.’ That is, based on a number of economic, familial,
and social factors, Anna is unlikely to overcome her circumstances and so will likely remain
in her current economic and social ‘roles.’ Often, academic articulations of Anna’s concerns
within the field of education, including in many of the social sciences, can range from
deterministic to disappointing. Most importantly, they evince a widespread lack of
concrete, actionable solutions to the types of problems that Anna faces.
Broadly speaking, people, and particularly students, aspire to a better version of
themselves and of the world. One feature of a better world is the recognition that education
is a primary, fundamental human right. That is, students should have the right to the
choice, the resources, and all available opportunities to equip themselves for their careers.
Higher education provides an indispensable space not only for intellectual growth but also
for launching careers. Yet, and this is the problem, the costs of higher education have
become so exorbitant that they are beginning to exclude students. Over the last thirty
years, the cost of higher education has so profoundly increased compared to other market
goods that it could be considered to be experiencing a type of hyperinflation. These
ballooning costs have prompted students to take monumental educational loans, which
may ignite a loan crisis in higher education and may have already financially impaired
many graduates in their early career stages. Moreover, if higher education is not already
amid what may be legitimately characterized as a funding crisis, then it inevitably will be.
Particularly, there is a great concern about the sustainability of higher education’s funding
because of its dependence on tax dollars and expansive student debt.
Christensen, Horn, Caldera, and Soares (2011) argued that college and university education
will be greatly transformed by technological change, potentially bringing a more affordable
type of education to most Americans. According to their work, the nearly threefold
escalation in fewer than 20 years of the average price of college tuition not only signals an
unsustainable cost trajectory but also indicates that the academy is ripe for technological
disruption. Christensen, with various co-authors, has repeatedly contended that colleges
and universities will encounter such severe technological disruption that many will face
bankruptcy and closure. Admittedly, the accuracy of Christensen’s predictions that half of

traditional colleges or universities would meet this fate within two decades, primarily due
to online education, remains unclear.
Yet what can be seen with some clarity is that too few solutions are being offered to
eliminate, or at least reduce, the exploding educational costs that are either excluding large
numbers of students from higher education or, if they do attend, saddling them with debt
far into middle age. Scholars, even prominent intellectuals such as Christensen, have not
appeared to articulate a practical solution, and in certain ways, do not seem to have fully
considered it. Many academics seem to write as if articulating a problem mirrors proposing
a solution. Sadly, neither solely identifying the problem nor relying on existing frameworks
offers a workable solution. The primary discourse in educational funding scholarship
centers on how to stretch fewer federal and state dollars into a substantive educational
experience, and calls and proposals for free universal higher education are countered with
the question of how to afford such proposals.
The desire for free higher education is not new; however, up until this point, politicization
of philanthropy and the limitations of traditional fiat returns have constrained economists
and scholars from even envisioning such a goal. If such ideas were articulated, they were
simply dismissed as utopian. In other words, historically, the funding of education has been
strictly tied to taxation or other forms of funding such as philanthropy. It has been fully
reliant on an outside forces, including parental support. As a whole, education funding has
been, seemingly at all times, contingent on a precarious confluence of economic,
governmental, philanthropic, and political circumstances.
In light of an ongoing and worsening student loan crisis, persistent funding cuts, and other
economic pressures, it is time to seek new approaches to the complexities of financing
higher education. Since few academics and fewer policy makers have proposed full-fledged
solutions to social reproduction in education, we articulate one here. The E2
implementation discussed in this paper has the goal of generating the money necessary to
support the educations of the Annas of the world: in the Bronx; in Boise; in Brooklyn; and,
with a crowdsourced effort and some luck, in Bangladesh and in Belarus.
This paper, in the spirit of Bernard Lietaer’s idea of value creation and the pioneering
research conducted by Galia Benartzi and the Hearts Project, centers on creating money to
fund education, writ large, without borders. In the following sections, the authors offer a
prototype solution, framing an initial model to fund higher education in ways that operate
outside of current approaches.
PART I: CAN TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION FUND HIGHER EDUCATION?
Can you imagine a world where all students are granted access to a fully-funded, free
college education? Before the advent of cryptocurrency, there were few financial
instruments, or asset classes, that possessed the technical complexity and wealthgenerating capabilities to attempt to enact such a meaningful mission.
Towards a New Funding Model

Over the past few years, Bronx Community College’s Cryptocurrency Research
Collaborative (BCC’s Crypto Collaborative ) has been researching the issue of wealth
generation, and, more precisely, how to deploy newly created wealth for the purposes of
higher education and science research. Lehner, Hunzeker, and Ziegler (2017), Lehner and
Ziegler (2018), and Lehner, Ziegler, and Carter (2019), in various iterations of BCC’s Crypto
Collaborative ’s scholarly work, have proposed how cryptocurrency could fund higher
education based on a dividend reinvestment approach predicated on Proof-of-Stake (PoS)
mining. Yet these models were time-bound in their wealth-generation opportunities, and
despite operating cryptocurrency nodes yielding compounding interest, if an exit strategy
to migrate to safe-haven assets had not been articulated and implemented prior to the
December 2017 Bitcoin (BTC) price escalation, the substantial amount of wealth that was
generated between 2016 and late October 2017could have been destroyed. Even with a
research group populated by members with significant Wall Street and institutional
financial research experience, the wealth-generation opportunities were limited, and a
crypto-to-USD rebalancing framework needed to be deployed in order to capture wealth.
However, in spite of market conditions, significant wealth was indeed generated from the
research group’s early models. In retrospect, it is likely that the most salient lesson from
our early prototypes is that PoS-mining-based wealth-generation opportunities are subject
to extreme volatility. Because of these extreme fluctuations in market prices, more nuanced
models were developed and deployed, and these methods are fully rooted in crypto-to-USD
frameworks. This is a particularly noteworthy and somewhat paradoxical issue since most
in the ‘crypto world’ view BTC, and other crypto assets, as a safe haven asset against USD,
and not the inverse. However, in practice, at least up until this point, USD is the safe-haven
asset, although it is not altogether clear how long this will remain the case. While
articulating this point may be redundant, part of the work in front of BCC’s Crypto
Collaborative will be to more fully research models that capture the wealth-generating
aspects of cryptocurrency while mediating its volatility with safer assets.
Background on E2
E2 is an implementation of a blockchain project that was abandoned by its original,
anonymous development team in late 2018 but continues to function based on the
resources of network participants. The E2 implementation, as we will call it from here on,
was not hacked, nor was its codebase comprised; rather, the protocol was ‘broken’ by the
exchanges that allow an enormous about of wash trading. This wash trading eventually
created a lack of synchrony between the actual blockchain and the exchanges’ databases.
The developers of Exclusive Coin, on which the E2 implementation is based, ultimately
decided to fork away from what is now E2. This decision, which was seemingly based on the
developers’ desire to not lose any additional value and on wanting to avoid the risk of a full
delisting, eventually led to a new genesis block for E2 in late spring 2019. The E2
implementation is not currently listed on any exchange. Its network participants are now
actively crowdsourcing its beta, beta/alpha stages of development.
Developing Second-Generation Models
Over the last four years, with submitted publications and focused research groups dating
back to 2015, BCC’s Crypto Collaborative , headed by Edward Lehner, has centered its

efforts on investigating ways that cryptocurrency could fund higher education. With recent
partnerships with Louis Carter’s Best Practice Institute and a development partnership
with Ovidiu Purice’s ProLedo, BCC’s Crypto Collaborative assembled a type of lean start-up
for FreeEd.io’s Free Education Project.
This paper outlines a framework for funding education at Bronx Community College, part
of the City University of New York, using the E2 implementation’s block rewards and
network effects. Focused on an understanding of Metcalf’s and Reed’s laws, this work
frames the financial methodology, rooted in network effect, for generating wealth via a
highly engaged developer community. Additionally, as noted above, this model needs to
continually rebalance its holdings between crypto-to-USD because of the volatility of the
underlying asset. The model presented here assembles three distinct parts: 1) shared block
rewards in order to fund education 2) maintaining a robust codebase for the technical
stability of the coin, and 3) valuation metrics and rebalancing techniques to capture the
wealth of the model.
This work and, moreover, its E2 implementation acknowledge the central concerns in
higher education funding and vividly and purposefully demonstrate a new model. Yet, as an
implementation cohering to a consensus mechanism with a protocol launched by
anonymous developers, the E2 implementation goes beyond a simple conceptual
framework for funding education. It is also a live and ‘in the wild’ project that currently
yields block rewards in real time with the potential to be used as a form of money.
Central among the reasons that we have chosen the E2 implementation is that, as an
anonymously launched and now live cryptocurrency with costs shared by network
participants, E2 does not conform to the framework of the Security and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Howie Test, and therefore likely cannot be considered a security. That
being said, at least from an Austrian-school economic perspective, cryptocurrency will
likely compete as money in that it may more fully retain its value compared to USD and
other currencies by fiat. It should be acknowledged that the hard money features of many
cryptocurrencies may eventually lead to more oversight from bodies such as the SEC, yet
such considerations exceed the scope of this paper.
PART II: MINING THE MONEY THAT IS NEEDED
A question central to our goal of funding higher education is whether a PoS network can
create ‘hard money.’ Here, we define hard money as a unit of account that maintains or
increases in value relative to other units of account. Historically, gold has proven to be the
world’s premier hard money, as its purchasing power has remained relatively unchanged
over hundreds, even thousands of years. A quality men’s suit, for instance, has always been
available at a cost of about one ounce of gold. As gold relates to cryptocurrency, Ammous
(2018) outlines the hard money qualities of BTC, comparing its value proposition to that of
a digital version of gold.
The discussion of money creation often sets off alarms because it is thought to infringe
upon the sovereign right of the nation state to oversee its own currency. However, money

should not be seen simply as an instrument that is solely tied to governments. In fact - as
clearly illustrated by extreme examples from the Weimar Republic, to Zimbabwe, and now
Venezuela - while a government can require that its official currency be used for all
transactions, the market itself in fact ultimately decides what real money is. Herein lies the
pivotal attraction of many cryptocurrencies: they have the potential to be a superior type of
hard money.
As a form of money by consensus, a cryptocurrency’s protocol can potentially set the rules
for its issuance such that the currency functions as a harder form of money than anything
previously in existence. BTC serves as the perfect example of this. In addition to being
fungible, censorship-resistant, and effectively impossible to counterfeit, BTC has a fixed
maximum supply as agreed upon by consensus. On top of that, as demonstrated by
Ammous (2018), BTC has a gradually increasing stock-to-flow ratio as its inflation rate
decreases over time. In May 2020, BTC’s inflation rate will roughly equal that of gold, the
global standard for ‘hard money.’ In 2024, the rate will decrease again to half that of gold.
BTC’s properties of hard money make it a good candidate for wealth-generation when
compared to fiat currencies. The monetary policy that determines the issuance of every
major fiat currency is, in fact, very much at odds with the notion of hard money. The US
dollar, as an example, has lost 96% of its purchasing power since the Federal Reserve
began printing money in 1913. It is becoming increasingly apparent that quantitative
easing, once a temporary measure employed by central banks in times of crisis, has now
emerged as the permanent default state of affairs. This does not bode well for the long-term
value of fiat currencies relative to other, harder forms of money.
Cryptocurrencies, with their monetary policies agreed upon by consensus (rather than
declared by fiat), offer a release valve that is likely to be used with more frequency in the
years to come. The monetary policy of the E2 implementation makes it, like BTC, a harder
form of money than competing fiat currencies. While the inflation rate of E2 currently
exceeds that of most fiat currencies, E2’s inflation rate is set, like BTC’s, to gradually
decrease, with the block rewards cutting in half by the summer of 2020. Currently, E2 has
roughly nearly 6 million coins in circulation and when the last block reward is mined in
over one hundred years, 35 million will be the total supply.
The value of a currency is, of course, determined by more than just its inflation rate. A
currency is only as valuable as the network that it can be used in. Here, we consider the
notion of value creation as developed by Bernard Lietaer with various co-authors. Lietaer
and Dunne (2013) point out that there have always been a wide variety of innovative
currencies (i.e., currencies not declared by fiat) in use by communities around the world.
Such currencies, which often work in tandem with fiat currencies, can, in addition to the
usual functions of a currency such as stimulating local trade, also provide value by, for
example, acknowledging skills not recognized by the dominant market system, reinforcing
social ties and community cohesion, and enhancing democratic control of trade.
Galia Benartzi, in her ‘Heart Market’ pilot project conducted in Israel in 2015 as part of
research leading up to the launching of the Bancor network, demonstrated on a small scale

the ability of a cryptocurrency to perform exactly the functions described by Lietaer. The
project consisted of approximately 20,000 mothers who were issued digital tokens called
“hearts” to use as payment to one another for services like babysitting, school pickups, and
cooking. Benartzi (2018) shows that within a year, USD 24 million worth of commerce was
conducted in just one small community. This commerce can be considered an addition to
the GDP of Israel, seemingly created out of thin air.
The work of Lietaer as demonstrated by Benartzi proves that a cryptocurrency, merely by
providing a means of exchange in a given community (network), can create value in that
community. The E2 implementation, we suggest, can do the same for a network of
stakeholders in the ‘community’ that is higher education.
This project envisions that E2 , in time, will be as fully liquid as a global money; yet such
claims are at this stage simply that: claims. In the process of research centered on this
project, the team will be able to more fully vet whether E2 can function as a money and
whether it can embody any of the properties ascribed to money.
Mining New Money to Fund Education
Central to the E2 implementation is the investment of PoS cryptocurrencies to yield
dividends. This is mapped out conceptually by Lehner et al. (2017) and illustrated in the
figures below, which underscore the wealth-generation potential of a PoS cryptocurrency
such as the E2 implementation.
Figure 1 depicts how a farming model generates new cryptocurrency. While Lehner et al.
(2017) provided two examples of cryptocurrencies to deploy in this fashion, this type of
framework can be deployed with E2. The investor (represented by the box in Figure 1) can
be either an individual, an institutional investor, or a type of hedge fund, such as a
sovereign wealth fund. For example, with the E2 implementation, only 5,000 coins are
required to run a masternode. As the node accrues coins, the dividends can be saved to
start a new node or spent by the investor.
Figure 1.

Figure 2 presents a broad framing of the intricate process of acquiring coins, setting up
nodes, and monitoring their progress. The first, critical step is to use funds to acquire E2
coins.
Figure 2.

Figure 3 underscores some of the details of the processes represented in Figures 1 and 2.
The figure notes how a coin farm (here represented by the five masternodes) dedicated to
a single network could provide compound interest. The middle section of the model shows
how the nodes’ collective dividends can be used to create a new node. The dividends then,
as shown to the right, can be reinvested or spent. Researchers working with software

engineers and bankers have tested prototypes of similar frameworks and were successful
in generating value.
Figure 3.

As Figure 4 shows, new nodes can be generated rapidly. The mathematical model of
dividend management below employs very conservative investment assumptions and
presumes linear coin generation amounts. Initial values of its variables are noted
parenthetically.
N = total number of nodes (starts at 20 nodes)
E = average number of coins generated per node per day (fixed : 10)
M = coin collateral required to run a node (fixed : 5000)
Q = days to create a new node from generated coins on existing nodes, literally M/(E
* N) in this formula (starts at 25 days)
Figure 4. Total Number of nodes (N) and days to create a node (Q) over time in days (T)

The number of days to create a new node (Q) decreases as time passes in days (T) and the
number of nodes (N) increases. The larger N is, the fewer days are necessary to generate a
new node. If the number of initial nodes is large enough, they will generate a new node in
under 25 days. New nodes are then added to the existing pool to generate yet more coins
and, because of compounding dividends, grow exponentially over time.
As seen in Figure 1, the process of dividend growth relies on the dynamic, reciprocal
interaction between generating new coins and sweeping new coins into new nodes in a
species of compound interest. However, the E2 implementation generates dividends to all
nodes based on the consensus mechanism, and rewards can be earned by all stakeholders.
Wealth generated needs to be periodically rebalanced into non-collorated safe-haven
assets like the US dollar, gold, or another cryptocurrency.
Enacting the farming model required the development of our own codebase to monitor
dividend growth, interface with various virtual private servers, and deploy new master
nodes. Open-source tools play a crucial role in coin farming, distributing both the
implementation of the protocol and any future improvements to the community.
Nodes are set up using open-source tools, and wrapper scripts or another type of
automated reporting are used to monitor the progress of the nodes or farm of nodes. The
automated reporting need not be simply for an institutional investor that may be running
its own nodes, but, depending on the way that it is coded, could also report to several
institutions, thereby creating an accountability measure to ensure that those who
committed to running nodes are in fact doing so. This idea of group accountability may
vastly increase the value of the network. Although deeper investigation is needed of
Metcalfe’s (2013) and Reed’s (2001) laws in application to the staking-coin ecosphere, the
general heuristics of the laws suggest that cryptocurrency accrues value predicated on a
network effect. Peterson (2017), for instance, has postulated that BTC’s value adheres to
the social network laws touched on above. Thus, sharing newly generated coin and/or new
nodes would increase the power of the network and consequently the funding benefits to
all participating institutions.

While the E2 implementation is live, it is very far from experiencing any type of network
effect. The large-scale potential of the E2 implementation, therefore, rests in collaboration.
Were institutions to work together while running their own coin farms, each coin could
greatly increase its value. Collaboration in the realm of funding is not the norm, and might
thus run up against institutional inertia, but the potential benefits are significant, as it
would boost dividends substantially.
Unsurprisingly, institutions do not share fiat currency. This tends to perpetuate funding
inequalities, as noted in the Council for Aid to Education (2018) endowment report, which
found that already-well-funded institutions tended to receive the higher endowments very
much at the expense of under-funded institutions. In this regard, a key innovation of a PoS
network such as the E2 implementation is that the sharing of node dividends by wealthier
institutions would not only profit the wealthier institutions, but would also profit less
wealthy network participants through the value added by network effect.
Since BTC reached its all-time high in 2017, crypto moved slowly into a bear market,
engendering pessimism about its potential. At the time of writing, in Fall 2019, BTC is at
approximately half of its all-time high, but the model described above still holds significant
promise. The underpinning frameworks of the model – dividend reinvestment, game
theoretics, hard-money, network infrastructure deployment, and open-source software –
depend neither on BTC's price nor on the market in general. Moreover, in more fully
aligning with Lietaer’s work, this type of model could create an alternative decentralized
money even if the staking coin is only trading on one exchange or, for that matter, even if
the coin did not have a BTC pair and was not redeemable for USD. A decentralized money
does not need to be coupled with a fiat currency to be widely deployed for educational
funding. In our case, if the City University of New York were simply to accept the staking
coin as a form of payment, that provision of making a medium of exchange liquidity and
creating a type of need on the market may provide validation to E2 and create an
opportunity for higher market appraisals.
PART III: BUILDING A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE DEVELOPER COMMUNITY
The Development of a Cryptocurrency
Staking and developing a cryptocurrency raises a lot of technical questions. From the outset,
stakeholders must decide whether the codebase is robust enough to be more fully developed.
BCC’s Crypto Collaborative , and now the Free Education Team, has functioned under the
notion that open-source crypto projects have the potential for wealth generation based on
robust codebase, even if that codebase dates back to the Satoshi C++ implementation of
2009. This notion was reinforced by Electric Capital’s Dev Report (2019), authored by Maria
Shen, underscoring how few developers exist in open-source crypto.
The E2 implementation, as noted, originates from the genesis block in 2016, when it was the
PoS Exclusive Coin, and is developing on that original codebase. By not building a token on
Ethereum, as many projects have done, E2 does not run into the complexities of securities
law. Additionally, since the project has at least a foundational codebase, the project’s

developers can focus on the possibility of offering unique code to the implementation. This
will nevertheless require considerable time and resources to implement and sustain.
Components to be considered include: 1) communication protocol between wallets, 2) wallet
encoding and encryption, 3) network consensus via the model for PoS, 4) blockchain
structure (block and transaction design), 5) integrity (the blockchain cannot be corrupted),
6) security (ranging from how hard it is to tamper with the blockchain to the anomalies that
can appear in the network), 7) trust, 8) support, 9) diversity of available platforms (mobile
wallets, hardware wallets), 10) continuous development (adding new features or improving
performance), and more.
Since all of the above components existed in the 2016 genesis block, the initial developer
workload for the E2 implementation is already considerably reduced. This solution affords
time for developers to concentrate on the important items on the list. Further, developers
can draw on the resources of other communities that are using the similar codebases. Such
communities may be able to offer support and even new features.
Maintaining the E2 Implementation: What’s Needed?
When developing on anonymously launched chain like the E2 implementation, there are,
thankfully, few regulatory hurdles; yet there are profound development concerns.
Development issues will appear over time, and some of them will have to be remedied as
quickly as possible. Unsolved issues can have a high impact on the users, community, and
cryptocurrency price, so the reaction time of the community functions as an extra layer of
trust and security for the cryptocurrency. Further, maintaining a cryptocurrency is not only
about responding to issues. Ongoing development is required to create higher levels of
security, improve network speed, implement transaction analytics, and more.
While the E2 implementation continues to propagate blocks, a good portion of development
on the protocol waned when the project was abandoned by its anonymous creators in late
2018. If E2 is to grow into a blockchain that functions as one way to fund a portion of higher
education costs, then a new team of developers is needed to take up the mantle. However,
given the very limited pool of qualified developers in open-source crypto noted by Electric
Capital’s (2019) report and the thousands of cryptocurrency projects in need of essential
work, the matter of crowdsourcing developers to the E2 project is critical. This section,
therefore, explores what is needed to attract highly effective developers to an open-source
software (OSS) cryptocurrency. This section also explores what attracts a wider community
of users and funders (stakeholders) to a cryptocurrency project. Our objective is to
determine 1) whether the E2 implementation is an attractive cryptocurrency for
developers and other stakeholders, and 2) what, if anything, we can do to support, first, the
developer community and then the wider community around E2 .
Our main contention is that the nature of a cryptocurrency, its opportunities for wealth
generation, and its ability to be a hedge against fiat are the primary factors driving OSS
projects and the participation from developers. In addition to the intention of the OSS
project, how the community of stakeholders enacts it mission is also of the utmost
importance. In light of the central banks’ undermining the hardness of money on a global
scale, cryptocurrencies are needed, wanted, and worthwhile in the eyes of a sufficiently

large group of holders. However, in order to organically grow the project, three
communities are required, which feed off each other to build long-term value: developers,
users, and funders.
The thesis that the OSS mission as an enacted ethos is a central factor in whether the
project can grow may be connected to and supported by the psychology that drives first
developers, then users, and finally investors to latch on to and contribute in their
respective ways to the E2 implementation. It is the same psychology as that which enables
teams more generally to perform at the highest levels – namely “emotional connectedness.”
Carter (2018) showed that the best performing teams in the workplace have a high level of
emotional connectedness. This is brought on by “great collaboration, a positive vision of the
future, alignment of values, respect for each other, and achieving killer outcomes” (p. 31).
In the context of the E2 implementation, emotional connectedness refers to the degree to
which first and primarily developers, but then also other stakeholders, have a feeling of
belonging, a higher purpose, respect for each other, and the ability to gain learning from the
community.

The psychology of emotional connectedness is important for understanding which
cryptocurrency projects will fail and which will succeed. It is also useful for informing the
strategies that we can employ to encourage developers to take up the E2 mantle, thereby
enabling the long-term growth of a wider and more complete ecosystem of stakeholders.
We can think of an open-source cryptocurrency and the community of developers, users,
and funders surrounding it along the same lines as an OSS project more generally. Both are
environments where stakeholders naturally coalesce out of the cloud, so to speak. In other
words, the open-source environment, by its nature, is very good at self-selecting for people
who share the same values. The origins and nature of OSS are important for establishing
the structural reasons for this. In this regard, Midha and Palvia (2012) provide a useful
“definition” of sorts: “A typical open source project starts when an individual (or a group)
feels the need for a new feature or entirely new software and someone in that group
eventually writes one. In order to share it with others who have similar needs, the software
is released under a license that allows the community to not only use it, but to also see the
source code and modify it to meet local needs and improve the product by fixing bugs” (p.
895). In other words, OSS starts with an individual or small group who identifies a need,
begins work on a solution, and makes the solution freely available to others. This is
supported by Schweik and English’s (2012) research on correlations between OSS success
and the early conditions of the OSS project, which demonstrated that open-source projects
flourish when developers themselves are the primary initial users of the software.

While OSS starts from identification of a need, its long-term success can be predicted to
some extent by whether the project has vocal early proponents. Schweik and English
(2012) note that “a relatively clearly defined vision and a mechanism to communicate the

vision early in the project's life" are critical for OSS success (p. 60). This is important in our
context because it tells us that for E2 to succeed, it needs proponents to clearly outline and
disseminate the vision. The need for dissemination of a clear vision, in turn, speaks to the
underlying psychology behind what makes an OSS project “sticky” for the wider
community. This is important because it can help us to craft the right vision. Note that E2 ’s
vision of self-funding for higher education can be considered to have a certain base-level of
worthiness to a large contingent of people.

Since the E2 implementation needs developers first and foremost to take up the mantle, it is
useful to consider the nature of the OSS profession in order to understand the underlying
psychology of developers. We contend that OSS leads from the start towards overrepresentation of certain personality traits. Without a boss or any type of traditional
hierarchy, developers in the OSS environment are required to produce work
independently. Casalnuovo et. al (2015) and Middleton et. al. (2019) showed that
successful OSS developers tend be those who independently build something that works,
often without pay. This leads to peer recognition and, finally, paid job offers from other
stakeholders in the wider ecosystem. In the merit-based, self-reliant work environment
that is OSS, micro-management, it seems, is replaced with the motivating factors of
recognition by peers and independent financial return. Further, Yoshikawa, Iwata, and
Sawada (2014), in their study on the importance of collaboration to the success of OSS,
found that projects in which key developers responded to pull requests and also worked on
other, non-related projects, had higher success rates. At the developer level, therefore, the
nature and ethos of OSS, again, maps closely to Carter’s (2019) contributing factors of
emotional connectedness for workplace success. Regarding the E2 implementation, this
knowledge can be leveraged to inform strategies for fostering the organic growth of a
developer community. Where the opportunity exists to promote a sort of “work culture” in
E2 ’s developer community, we therefore should encourage a merit-based approach in
which developers who, ideally, work together on other projects actively respond to pull
requests.
The origin and development of the Linux open-source operating system (OS) is a useful
example of success in OSS in that it demonstrates all of the above properties. It fits Midha
and Palvia’s definition for how OSS starts, it is in line Schweik and English’s research on
correlations of success, and it demonstrates how the underlying psychology drives the
birth and growth of open-source communities. Linux as an example is also useful in that it
demonstrates the enormous potential of the OSS model to build value.

Linux started with a single developer, Linus Torvald, who wanted an alternative to
Windows. Torvald primarily began work on the project because he personally wanted to
use it (Moody, 2002). Torvald was the software’s first user and its biggest early advocate.
As with so many inventions born of necessity, others quickly discovered the utility of

Torvald’s work. Many of them started contributing to the OSS that would become the Linux
OS. Linux would eventually be adopted by non-developers (users), and before long, a whole
ecosystem evolved, with enterprises building for-profit products on top of the open-source
code. Linux and the ecosystem around it are now, of course, incredibly valuable, providing
the software foundation for billions of Android devices.

As we have seen, developers must compose the first adherents to an OSS project. Without
them, there is no project for others to latch on to. However, an OSS project must also attract
users and funders if it is to achieve long-term success. In this regard, the utility of the
project is certainly important. However, particularly for cryptocurrency projects - which
are, by definition, built on money rather than software utility - the emotional
connectedness of the wider ecosystem of stakeholders is arguably more important. For a
cryptocurrency to succeed, users and funders must also “coalesce out of the cloud” and join
the network so that 1) the value of the network increases in line with value aggregation
theories connected to Metcalfe’s law (for example see: Zhang, Liu, & Xu, 2015), and 2)
funding for further development can be secured. In this case, we can say that the emotional
connectedness of adherents to a cryptocurrency is driven by two of Carter’s factors, namely
a “positive vision of the future” and “alignment of values.”

In the world of cryptocurrencies, BTC maps closely to Linux in terms of its origins, organic
growth, and the value that it ultimately generates. However, the reasons for BTC’s success,
it can be argued, are also closely related to the emotional connectedness of all its
adherents, not just early developers. The premise here is that a cryptocurrency, more than
pure software like Linux, is more influenced by the emotional connectedness of the wider
community. Further, this emotional connectedness is related to whether the
cryptocurrency itself is considered truly “worthwhile” by that community. BTC is a useful
example here because of the large number of like-minded individuals who have coalesced
out of the cloud to support it. The BTC example is also instructive for helping us understand
whether E2 can ultimately succeed and how it should be promoted to encourage success.
Again, note that E2 - as an initiative for the funding of higher education - has a certain
base-level of worthiness for a significant contingent of people.

BTC started when an individual (or, perhaps, a small group) known as Satoshi Nakamoto
wanted an alternative to fiat money, so he/she/they built an open-source, decentralized,
censorship-resistant protocol for money. The BTC white paper crystallized the vision of the
project and, with Satoshi as an early advocate, other developers came onboard by
contributing to the codebase (Champagne, 2014). Critically, the values of these early
developers very closely aligned with the values outlined in the white paper and in
statements from BTC’s key advocate, Satoshi. Early contributors largely fell into the so
called “cypherpunk” mindset, characterized by libertarian ideals including distrust of the

status-quo financial system and an emphasis on privacy (Champagne, 2014). Later, nondevelopers with a similar ideological bent, seeing the value and aligning in beliefs, latched
on. BTC’s growth, of course, continues (in waves) to this day by attracting like-minded
individuals. At this stage, it has sufficient power to even influence the value sets of some
newcomers. The lesson here for E2 is that, in crystalizing the project’s vision for the public,
we should not hesitate to appeal to the core values of the people whom we consider our
target adherents, not unlike Satoshi appealed to those frustrated with status-quo monetary
policy.

It can be argued that BTC, as the first mover in the world of cryptocurrencies, is a special
case. Let us examine, therefore, the much newer cryptocurrency Grin as another
informative example for determining the path to E2 ’s success. Grin’s niche in the
cryptocurrency world is that, with a focus on privacy and scalability, the project staunchly
rejects the need for an initial coin offering, pre-mine, founder’s reward, or block reward for
developers. In other words, the project embraces the concept of a “fair launch.” For
development, Grin must therefore rely – like BTC – entirely on donations. Note that E2 also
fits “fair launch” criteria.

The ability of a cryptocurrency to successfully rely entirely on donations for its
development is indicative of the cryptocurrency’s potential for long-term success. It proves,
in a sense, that the vision of the cryptocurrency is “worthwhile” to a sufficiently large group
of people. In this regard, Grin’s success in receiving donations for development is telling.
Grin developer Michael Cordner’s story exemplifies the OSS process, especially as it relates
to funding. Cordner started working on the Grin protocol in May 2017 without pay (Hsue,
2019). His contributions were judged by his peers, as well as by a growing network of
interested stakeholders. After the “probationary period,” Cordner had built sufficient social
capital to merit funding from the community. Three funding campaigns in 2018 netted him
close to USD 100,000 in donations from the Grin community, all before Grin was even live.
In February 2019, Cordner launched another campaign to fund his developer efforts,
raising a further USD 70,000 within days. Throughout 2019, Grin has consistently garnered
large donations from its community, including an anonymous 50 BTC (approx. USD
300,000) in May (Kim, 2019).
The support for developers that has coalesced from the cloud that is the Grin community
starkly contrasts with the lack of support for developers on the much larger (by market cap
and brand recognition) cryptocurrency Litecoin. A fork of BTC differentiated by a few
minor tweaks to the protocol (namely block size, issuance rate, and total supply), Litecoin
is a cryptocurrency that is widely criticized as unnecessary; its primary use-case, some
argue, is merely to operate as a testnet for BTC (which, incidentally, has a testnet of its
own). Considering the above discussion on the importance of emotional connectedness to
the success of OSS in general, it should be not surprising, therefore, that there is a lack of

robust support for Litecoin from its community relative to that of Grin from its community.
The Litecoin Foundation, which manages funding for the cryptocurrency’s developers,
overwhelmingly relies on a single donor, Litecoin’s founder Charlie Lee. Since 2017, Lee’s
donations have accounted for some 80 percent of the foundation’s funding (Foxley, 2019).
Development on Litecoin, in turn, seems to have mostly stopped, with nothing meaningful
contributed to the codebase since October 2018 (Kajpust, 2019). Contrasting the organic
support from the community for Grin (which has a community bolstered by its emotional
connectedness) with the lack of organic support from Litecoin’s community (which does
not) tells us that E2 - with its worthwhile goal of funding higher education - is on the right
track for developing long-term value as a cryptocurrency.

In summary, for a cryptocurrency to succeed, it must, first and foremost, be worthwhile in
the eyes of a large enough audience. E2 , we argue, satisfies that condition at a base level,
but the project’s vision must be made clear for it to have sufficient power to galvanize early
adopters, particularly developers. Built upon this solid foundation, it is possible for a
cryptocurrency to reach critical mass, grow its community of supporters, and build longterm value for all. However, particularly considering that E2 currently has no active
developers, work will have to be done to support the project’s early developer community.
Such work should focus on building the emotional connectedness of developers within the
confines of the OSS workplace environment.

Conclusion, Limitations, and a Call for More Research
In this work, the funding thesis proposed underscores how using open-source staking coins
could be one alternative to the relatively fixed way of understanding how to fund higher
education. More specifically, we propose the E2 implementation as a case study for
examining the degree to which a cryptocurrency may generate capital for higher
education’s funding via dividend reinvestment and network effects. The dividend
reinvestment approach may afford for the creation of a network effect, thus generating
significant capital for the purposes of higher education.
The research presented was based on models developed in 2016 and has been amended
over the last few years. However, the proposed model is only one way that wealth could be
generated in order to fund higher education. Whereas the initial BCC Crypto Collaborative
models underscored a strategy of staking coins, the framework discussed in this paper has
the potential to generate substantial new capital by crowdsourcing one underdeveloped
chain, E2. With that point noted, PoS coins specifically can be deployed in such a way that
other stakeholders can be invited into the project to encourage its development and
stabilize the volatility of the coin on exchanges. Additionally, in newer models being
developed, there may be a way that a number of coins, akin to a type of index fund, could be
deployed in the interest of funding higher education, similar to how the E2 implementation
example functions in this paper.

The power of this enacted framework rests in the notion that if a number of institutions
collaborate, or if hedge funds only seeking alpha joined, for example by running their own
coin farms, the USD proceeds could be used as the stakeholders see fit. Since the coin would
be on tradeable markets, the value of each coin could grow significantly. Higher value coins
could subsequently be rebalanced into USD or reinvested into the network. A collaboration
such as this is a full departure from the business-as-usual frameworks deployed by college
development offices and university endowment strategies.
The wealth-generation aspects of this proposal describe the redeployment of wealth into
education. For example, a well-funded institution - say any of the top ten endowments
measured by USD - could dedicate its dividends, or portions thereof, to student
scholarships or any domain of funding consistent with its vision. Beyond simply benefitting
one institution, newly generated coins and/or new nodes could be shared. In line with
network-effect principles, the sharing of nodes increases the value of the coins in the entire
network. Node sharing can be seen, therefore, not merely as an egalitarian endeavor,
although it would serve to address educational disparities. By contrast, the notion of an
institution sharing its dividends in USD remains unheard of, primarily because fiat
currency has already achieved its network effect. Of course, in a bear market, such as the
one in 2018 through the spring 2019, network value will not always increase in terms of
fiat. Nonetheless, the dividends continue to grow in this model, and the blockrewards are
robust. Although network effect is not the focus of this work, in order to gain a deeper
understanding of how Metcalfe’s (2013) and Reed’s (2001) social network laws can be
applied specifically to the PoS environment and how the phenomenon of network effect can
benefit higher education funding, the authors propose additional research.
In this paper, we put forward that the utilization of a network, with the goal of wealth
generation via the achievement of a network effect, for the public good counterbalances
any concerns about PoS coins within the fund, as the social intelligence and reputation
often required to participate are already achieved within the prototype itself. Surely,
leveraging a coin’s potentially exclusionary characteristic for the greater good cannot be
construed as harmful. We posit that a network such as the E2 implementation may not only
make higher education funding more egalitarian and accessible, but also may drive
innovation by granting researchers an independence and ability to collaborate rather than
compete. Such independence would benefit researchers, their colleagues, and the public
good. Further research is required in order to understand the long-term viability of such a
strategy. For instance, models that capture the wealth-generating aspects of
cryptocurrency while mediating its volatility with safer assets should be more fully
developed.
An additional point of discussion is in the call for a next generation of new research which
should center on how the hard money characteristics of some cryptocurrencies compare to
those of gold. Although the point is considered here briefly, the concept is worthy of
intensive research. It is worth noting that gold will likely always be hard money based on
chemistry. Bitcoin, although it is considered hard money, is perhaps more complicated in
that it is reliant on social and computational factors that emerge as a set of risk-factors
mediating against the asset class. Roy Sebag (2019) astutely addressed the hard-money

aspect of both commodities in a recent article. Sebag addressed Barry Silbert’s Grayscale
Investments’ ‘Drop Gold’ campaign, underscoring that although BTC and gold can both be
considered hard money, some distinctions urgently need to be made. Sebag’s conception of
hard money seemingly contrasts with Ammous’s (2018) discussion of the same topic in the
Bitcoin Standard. Nonetheless, the call for additional research related to money’s hardness
is required, since, in no small way, the timebound aspects of wealth generation as seen in
Lehner et. al (2017) need to be mediated against.
In this paper, we have focused on the live blockchain E2 as a potential implementation that
can fund higher education. As a live blockchain, the development of E2 must be closely
monitored. In addition to more research and prototyping, new development tools such as
better coin control tools and monitoring mechanisms are required and/or need to be made
publicly available on Github or another developer forum. The authors are aware of the
potential for fraud, but are optimistic that the type of research and reconnaissance done by
the team in developing the prototype can guard against it. Further, more stakeholders including node operators, investors, and invariably, exchanges - will need to be involved. In
this regard, our research shows that the ethos of OSS should be embraced. We should
leverage the emotional connectedness of, first, developers and then all stakeholders who
coalesce out of the cloud to support the mission of funding higher education. To do so, it is
essential, as a starting point, that we crystalize the importance of our vision to a sufficiently
wide audience.
There are many entities, including state and federal governments, that can facilitate, and at
times hamper, the funding of higher education within the United States and globally.
Multiple stakeholders, including some financial interests, are involved in higher education’s
funding, all of which can complicate a proposal like this. Yet, historically, too few
opportunities have been presented that ease the problems relating to the funding of
education. Nor have there been successful proposals for ways to navigate beyond the
discussion of traditional student and institutional funding means. At this point, however,
cryptocurrency and the technologies and social constructs supporting it may present a
non-traditional funding mechanism that is fully situated outside of government. While
clearly adding a layer of complexity, this mechanism presents an unprecedented
opportunity that is worth pursuing.
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